A subsite of ZERO TRUST LAB

WARNING · WINDOWS & BING

Unlocking
is not a
search request.

My computer. My choice.

A click to sign in to Windows. Then an unintended Bing search. Opening web content should require a clear, recognizable choice.

ONE CLICK. TWO OUTCOMES.01 / 02
INTENDED

Unlock the PC.

Get to the password field.

01

After signing in

OPENED UNEXPECTEDLY02

A PRESET SEARCH

F1 Kimi Antonelli
Search resultsAdsMore suggestions

Forensically verified sequence · simplified illustration
No connection to Bing. No live search.

A click alone does not tell you what a person wants.

CONTROL BEFORE CONVENIENCE

01 / THE INCIDENT & FORENSICS

One user’s account. Verified by local system artifacts.

A search
the user never intended.

The user wanted to sign in. He had neither typed the search term nor intentionally selected it.

Clicking the lock screen to bring up the password prompt intersected a center-screen Windows Spotlight hotspot (//item[2] at 800×550). Exactly 405 milliseconds after password sign-in completed, Windows launched the preset Bing search shown below.

REPORTED

The click was intended to bring up the password field. A web search was not intended.

User’s account
VISIBLE

Bing displays the search, an AI summary, shopping ads, and additional search suggestions.

Screenshot
PROVEN

Windows lock screen hotspot //item[2] (SubscribedContent-338387, coordinates 800×550) captured the wake click, fired launchUri 405 ms after sign-in, and Edge recorded the preset URL as a local search term (keyword_search_terms).

Local system forensics

THE SCREENSHOT

The search goes beyond the search term.

User-provided screenshot of Bing results for F1 Kimi Antonelli. Search results appear on the left, with shopping ads on the right and additional search suggestions below.
User’s original screenshot · embedded unchanged, with a separate highlight overlay.The preceding unlock sequence is reconstructed forensically below.
01

A name the user did not choose to search for.

The search field shows “F1 Kimi Antonelli.” The fact that this page opened does not, by itself, establish an intentional interest in the topic.

What the URL reveals—and what local forensics proved
https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2

While the parameter form=M407F2 is not explained in public documentation, local forensic analysis of the Windows ContentDeliveryManager cache resolved its origin completely: the exact URI string https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2 was delivered to the PC by Microsoft’s Iris service (fd.api.iris.microsoft.com) inside lock screen creative batch 1794████61 (campaign WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE, content ID 9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d) as the hardcoded launchUri target for lock screen hotspots //item[1] and //item[2].

FORENSIC RECONSTRUCTION · PARTIALLY ANONYMIZED PRIMARY ARTIFACTS

100-nanosecond FILETIME & SQLite evidence

Who entered the search command?
Microsoft’s lock screen payload.

A local forensic triage of the affected Windows 11 system was conducted to determine who or what entered the query “F1 Kimi Antonelli” into Bing. To prevent device or telemetry correlation by Microsoft, personal identifiers (<user>, SID) as well as the middle segments of long delivery/content IDs, asset hashes, and sub-millisecond ticks have been partially redacted (██████), while preserving prefixes/suffixes, hotspot coordinates, transition bitmasks, and millisecond deltas.

The evidence chain across four independent OS and browser subsystems proves that no human typed the query. Instead, a preloaded Microsoft promotional hotspot positioned near the center of the lock screen intercepted the user’s wake/unlock click and automatically launched Microsoft Edge 405 milliseconds after password authentication.

01 / PAYLOAD SOURCEContentDeliveryManager

Preloaded by Microsoft Iris

On November 14, 2026 at 14:04:██████ UTC, Windows package Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager cached creative batch 1794████61 under subscription 338387 (creative WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE, content ID 9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d). The asset pairs a Monza wallpaper of Mercedes-AMG F1 car #12 (bearing the Microsoft sponsor logo) with the action setLockScreenHotspots.

02 / CENTER-SCREEN TRAPHotspot //item[2] at 800×550

Positioned where users click to unlock

The manifest defines three clickable hotspots: //item[0] (topRight, form=M401PI), //item[1] (topLeft, form=M407F2), and //item[2] (placed directly inside the screen interior at landscapeX: 800, landscapeY: 550 with form=M407F2). Registry telemetry confirms that //item[0] and //item[1] were never hovered or clicked—only //item[2] was hit when waking the lock screen.

03 / BROWSER TRANSITIONEdge SQLite History

OS auto-launch, zero keystrokes

In Edge’s History SQLite database (visits.id = 3714), the navigation carries transition bitmask 0x30000006: core type 6 = PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_TOPLEVEL with FROM_ADDRESS_BAR = 0, typed_count = 0, and from_visit = 0. Unlike actual user searches in the same database (which include gs_lcrp, FORM=ANAB01, and PC=U531), the URL has zero Omnibox parameters.

04 / PROFILE & HISTORY EFFECTkeyword_search_terms

Recorded as a user search + Back-button trap

Despite typed_count = 0 and AUTO_TOPLEVEL, Edge inserted "f1 kimi antonelli" into the local keyword_search_terms table as if the user had searched for it. Just 492 ms after opening the page, Bing injected https://www.bing.com/?form=SPHPRE1&bbtnserp=1&bbtnfrm=M407F2 into the tab’s history to intercept the browser Back button.

CHRONOLOGICAL FORENSIC TIMELINE (NOVEMBER 14–15, 2026) UTC & Local Time (Europe/Zurich, UTC+1)
Timestamp (UTC) Local (CET) Artifact / Log Source Forensic Event & Technical Evidence
2026-11-14
14:04:██████Z
15:04:██████Preload NTFS Metadata
Creatives\338387\1794████61
ContentDeliveryManager downloads creative batch 1794████61 (WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE) containing the hardcoded URI https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2.
2026-11-14
21:46:██████Z
22:46:██████Impression Registry FILETIME
1343916639████8642
Lock screen displays creative 9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d and logs eventName=impression for the background image and hotspots //item[0], //item[1], and //item[2].
2026-11-15
13:03:44.641Z
14:03:44.641t = 0.000 s Windows System Log
Kernel-Power ID 566
Reason: InputHid (Session transition 28 → 30). The user moves the mouse / clicks the lock screen to wake the display and bring up the password field.
2026-11-15
13:03:44.686Z
14:03:44.686+45 ms after wake Registry FILETIME
13439221424686████
//item[2]?eventName=hover is recorded in CreativeEventCache\SubscribedContent-338387 as the cursor/click lands on center hotspot //item[2] (800×550) to open the password prompt.
2026-11-15
13:03:55.303Z
14:03:55.303+10.662 s Windows Security Log
Event ID 4624 (Type 2)
User finishes typing the password and presses Enter. Windows completes interactive logon (LogonType 2) and fires Winlogon session unlock notification (Event ID 811/812).
2026-11-15
13:03:55.708Z
14:03:55.708+405 ms after unlock Registry FILETIME
13439221435708████
//item[2]?eventName=click is committed to CreativeEventCache\SubscribedContent-338387. Windows executes the queued ctx.action = "launchUri" for //item[2].
2026-11-15
13:03:56.115Z
14:03:56.115+407 ms after launchUri Edge History SQLite
visits.id = 3714
Microsoft Edge opens https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2 with transition = 0x30000006 (AUTO_TOPLEVEL), typed_count = 0, and writes "f1 kimi antonelli" into keyword_search_terms.
2026-11-15
13:03:56.607Z
14:03:56.607+492 ms after page open Edge History SQLite
visits.id = 3715
Bing’s script inserts https://www.bing.com/?form=SPHPRE1&bbtnserp=1&bbtnfrm=M407F2 (opener_visit = 3714) to intercept the browser Back button, followed by visits.id = 3716 (13:03:56.609Z).
Primary Artifact 01: Cached Lock Screen Manifest (TargetedContentCache JSON, anonymized)

Extracted from C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\TargetedContentCache\v3\338387\9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d_2 (and raw batch file Creatives\338387\1794████61). Notice how //item[2] is positioned at landscapeX: 800, landscapeY: 550 with the exact form=M407F2 URI:

{
  "class": "content",
  "name": "LockScreen",
  "subscriptionId": "338387",
  "contentId": "9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d",
  "properties": {
    "landscapeImage": {
      "fileSize": 852195,
      "width": 1920,
      "height": 1080,
      "sha256": "+GDN8u████████████████████████████L5DQNY="
    },
    "showImageOnSecureLock": { "bool": true },
    "onRender": {
      "action": "setLockScreenHotspots",
      "parameters": {
        "ctx.action": "setLockScreenHotspots",
        "ctx.contentId": "9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d",
        "ctx.creativeId": "1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000",
        "ctx.placementId": "SubscribedContent-338387"
      }
    }
  },
  "items": [
    {
      "entityId": "1280██████████91889",
      "properties": {
        "template": { "text": "infoHotspot" },
        "location": { "text": "topRight" },
        "description": { "text": "Autodromo Nazionale, Monza, Italien" },
        "copyright": { "text": "© Steve Etherington for Mercedes-Benz Grand Prix Ltd." },
        "onClick": {
          "action": "launchUri",
          "parameters": {
            "uri": "https://www.bing.com/search?q=Autodromo+Nazionale%2C+Monza%2C+Italien&form=M401PI",
            "ctx.containerPath": "//item[0]"
          }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "properties": {
        "template": { "text": "basicHotspot" },
        "location": { "text": "topLeft" },
        "title": { "text": "Verfolgen Sie den Kampf um einen historischen Meistertitel – es gibt noch mehr zu sehen" },
        "actionText": { "text": "Tauchen Sie ein in die Welt des Rennsports" },
        "onClick": {
          "action": "launchUri",
          "parameters": {
            "uri": "https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2",
            "ctx.containerPath": "//item[1]"
          }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "properties": {
        "template": { "text": "basicHotspot" },
        "location": { "text": "specific" },
        "landscapeX": { "number": 800 },
        "landscapeY": { "number": 550 },
        "portraitX": { "number": 550 },
        "portraitY": { "number": 800 },
        "title": { "text": "Erfahren Sie, was hinter dem jüngsten Formel-1-Weltmeister aller Zeiten steckt" },
        "actionText": { "text": "Entdecken Sie rasante Innovationen" },
        "description": { "text": "Mit gerade einmal 20 Jahren schreibt Kimi Geschichte. Erfahren Sie, wie die Technologie von Microsoft Spitzenteams hilft, sich gegen die Konkurrenz zu behaupten." },
        "onClick": {
          "event": "click",
          "action": "launchUri",
          "parameters": {
            "uri": "https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2",
            "ctx.action": "launchUri",
            "ctx.containerPath": "//item[2]",
            "ctx.placementId": "SubscribedContent-338387"
          }
        }
      },
      "tracking": {
        "parameterized": [
          {
            "uri": "https://ris.api.iris.microsoft.com/v1/a/{ACTION}?CID=1280██████████91889&region=CH&lang=DE-DE%2CDE-CH%2CFR-CH&PID=426████02&AN=1228████40&PG=PC000█████.0000000IRS&REQASID=████████████&UNID=338387&itemindex=2"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  ]
}
Primary Artifact 02: Windows Registry Event Cache & LogonUI Keys (FILETIME proof)

Values read from HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ContentDeliveryManager\CreativeEventCache\SubscribedContent-338387 and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI\Creative. Each 18-digit integer is a Windows FILETIME (100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601 UTC):

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI\Creative\S-1-5-21-████████████-1003\13439161██████4670]
contentId             = 9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d
landscapeImage        = C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\Assets\7e9e671f████████████████████████████████a1163e509
showImageOnSecureLock = 1

[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ContentDeliveryManager\CreativeEventCache\SubscribedContent-338387]
LastCreativeBatchId = 1794████61

# Initial render impressions (2026-11-14 21:46:██████ UTC):
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-0-/?eventName=impression        = 1343916639████8642
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-0-//item[0]?eventName=impression = 1343916639████8678
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-0-//item[2]?eventName=impression = 1343916639████8712
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-0-//item[1]?eventName=impression = 1343916639████8739

# Hover recorded 45 ms after InputHid wake event (2026-11-15 13:03:44.686████ UTC):
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-3-//item[2]?eventName=hover      = 13439221424686████

# Click/launchUri fired 405 ms after password sign-in (2026-11-15 13:03:55.708████ UTC):
1794████61`WW_1280██████████91889_DE-DE`0`9592d1████████████████████ed0b6d`82800`338387`134458560000000000-1-//item[2]?eventName=click      = 13439221435708████
Primary Artifact 03: Microsoft Edge SQLite History Database (urls, visits, keyword_search_terms)

Records from C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History. Note the contrast between the OS-initiated AUTO_TOPLEVEL navigation (URL_ID=2144, no Omnibox parameters) and a genuine user-typed Edge address bar search (URL_ID=2175, which carries gs_lcrp, FORM=ANAB01, and PC=U531):

-- 1. Table: urls
URL_ID=2144 | visit_count=2 | typed_count=0 | hidden=0
  title: F1 Kimi Antonelli - Suchen
  url:   https://www.bing.com/search?q=F1+Kimi+Antonelli&form=M407F2

URL_ID=2145 | visit_count=1 | typed_count=0 | hidden=0
  title: F1 Kimi Antonelli - Suchen
  url:   https://www.bing.com/?form=SPHPRE1&bbtnserp=1&bbtnfrm=M407F2

-- Comparison: genuine user-typed search in Edge Omnibox on the same device:
URL_ID=2175 | visit_count=1 | typed_count=0 | hidden=0
  title: domain lookup - Suchen
  url:   https://www.bing.com/search?q=domain+lookup&cvid=████████████&gs_lcrp=EgRlZGdl...&FORM=ANAB01&PC=U531

-- 2. Table: visits (WebKit timestamps in microseconds since 1601-01-01 UTC)
VisitID=3714 | visit_time=13439221436115███ (2026-11-15 13:03:56.115███ UTC)
  url_id=2144 | from_visit=0 | opener_visit=0 | transition=0x30000006 (Core=AUTO_TOPLEVEL, FROM_ADDRESS_BAR=0)

VisitID=3715 | visit_time=13439221436607███ (2026-11-15 13:03:56.607███ UTC)
  url_id=2145 | from_visit=0 | opener_visit=3714 | transition=0x30000000 (Core=LINK)
  url: https://www.bing.com/?form=SPHPRE1&bbtnserp=1&bbtnfrm=M407F2

VisitID=3716 | visit_time=13439221436609███ (2026-11-15 13:03:56.609███ UTC)
  url_id=2144 | from_visit=0 | opener_visit=3715 | transition=0x30000000 (Core=LINK)

-- 3. Table: keyword_search_terms (local search profile contamination)
keyword_id=2 | url_id=2144 | term="F1 Kimi Antonelli" | normalized_term="f1 kimi antonelli"

02 / PERSONAL CHOICE

Adults, too.

I decide
what I open.

Even a harmless topic can be unwanted. People unlocking their computers should decide for themselves whether to open a search engine—and what to search for.

An extreme outcome does not have to occur for this concern to matter. The unexpected web request already raises the question: Where was the clear choice to do this?

A

A name can
be ambiguous.

A preset search can also match other people or meanings. That could surface sexualized, violent, or extremist content. The actual results depend on factors including the full query and the filters in use.

B

A request does not
establish interest.

Forensic inspection proved that Edge recorded this OS-triggered request in its local keyword_search_terms table just like a user-typed query, while Windows configured a click-tracking ping to ris.api.iris.microsoft.com. How Microsoft links such events to cloud profiles on its servers is documented in general terms. [03]

C

A screen is not
always private.

Additional content can become visible during a presentation, in a classroom, or around other people. The person using the device should be able to choose when to open web content and what to open.

Hypothetical: an athlete named “Osama”

An ambiguous query could also return results about Osama bin Laden. Additional terms such as “F1” and a last name can narrow the meaning; the name alone does not determine what the results will contain. This example illustrates the risk of an unwanted association. It is not a search result observed in this incident.

These are possible risks, not claims about the results shown. The screenshot does not show pornographic or extremist content. Even a mention of a notorious figure would not, by itself, establish that content was illegal or that the user had an interest in it.

A content filter cannot replace a choice. Microsoft acknowledges that SafeSearch does not catch everything. A filter also does not prevent the unwanted request itself. [02]

03 / THE DEMAND

To Microsoft and other providers.

Choose first.
Then open.

Signing in should give people access to their own computers. Opening additional web content should require a clear, recognizable choice.

Copy the statement
  1. 01

    Make the web action clear.

    Before a click, it must be clear that the action will open a website or a search.

  2. 02

    Separate sign-in from content.

    The ordinary click to reach the password field should not also select web content.

  3. 03

    Keep users in control.

    These features must be easy to turn off and respect the user’s chosen safety and privacy settings.

  4. 04

    Interpret requests accurately.

    Automatic or accidental requests should not be treated as intentional expressions of search interest.

04 / TAKE ACTION

Settings and documentation.

Take back control.

These steps can help document what happened and reduce lock screen content. Setting names may vary by Windows version.

01

Document what happened.

Note the time, Windows version, full URL, and visible lock screen elements. Preserve local artifacts under ContentDeliveryManager and Edge’s History database before they rotate.

Check for personal information before sharing. Do not record passwords.

02

Check the lock screen.

Settings → Personalization → Lock screen

Turn off widgets. If “Lock screen status” appears instead, choose “None.” Use your own picture and turn off the option for facts, tips, and other content, if available. [01]

03

Choose your content filters.

Bing SafeSearch offers a “Strict” setting for explicit text, images, and videos. It reduces those results but does not replace control over whether a search starts in the first place. [02]

This site does not change any settings on your device.

05 / CHECK THE SOURCES

Documentation as of November 15, 2026

A clear objection.
A verifiable basis.

The user’s account describes the sequence. Local system forensics prove the exact lock screen trigger and timeline. The primary sources explain the features and the legal framework.

  1. 01
    Microsoft: Customize the lock screen

    Describes opening lock screen content after sign-in and the available lock screen settings.

    PRODUCT DOCUMENTATION
  2. 02
    Microsoft: Bing SafeSearch

    Explains the filter levels. The Bing settings page notes the limits of filtering.

    PRODUCT DOCUMENTATION
  3. 03
    Microsoft: How search history is stored

    Describes search data and its storage. Local forensics confirmed storage in Edge’s keyword_search_terms table; cloud-side profiling remains governed by Microsoft’s backend systems.

    DATA PROCESSING
  4. 04
    47 U.S.C. § 230

    Statutory protection concerning third-party content; definitions and exceptions.

    U.S. FEDERAL LAW
  5. 05
    Anderson v. TikTok, Third Circuit, 2024

    A case-specific ruling on recommendations, not a decision about Windows or Bing. PDF.

    COURT DECISION
  6. 06
    15 U.S.C. § 45(n) and FTC unfairness

    Requirements for an unfair business practice. See also: FTC Policy Statement.

    LAW & AGENCY GUIDANCE

ZERO TRUST LAB

About this subsite.

Independence, rights & liability

This independent informational subsite is a project of Zero Trust Lab. It is not an official Microsoft website and does not claim Microsoft’s endorsement. Rights to third-party names, trademarks, and material remain with their respective owners.

The content provides general information and education, not individualized legal advice. Errors and later changes are possible. No warranty is given for accuracy, completeness, currency, or suitability for a particular purpose. Any limitation of liability applies only to the extent permitted by law; mandatory statutory liability remains unaffected.

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The site code sets no cookies and contains no analytics, advertising scripts, or externally loaded fonts. The screenshot is a local image; this page does not run a Bing search or load live Bing content. All published forensic excerpts have been partially anonymized to remove personal device or account identifiers. Hosting and access services may process technical connection data and cookies. External websites have their own policies.

Questions or feedback: [email protected]

The original screenshot

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Unmodified original screenshot of the Bing results page that opened.